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The article analyzes the Russo-Japanese peace treaty negotiations in 2013-
2019. Despite the rapprochement in the trade, economic, political and hu-
manitarian spheres, the territorial dispute remains an obstacle, significantly 
complicating bilateral ties. There remain disagreements on the sovereignty 
over the southern Kuril Islands, on acceptable conditions for resolving a 
territorial dispute, as well as on the significance of the territorial dispute for 
the development of bilateral relations. The plans for the implementation of 
joint economic activities on the southern Kuril Islands are also analyzed. It 
is concluded that Russia and Japan need to continue to build upon the result 
of rapprochement initiated by the leaders of the countries and continue ne-
gotiations on the peace treaty that will upgrade their relations.
Keywords:
Russo-Japanese relations
Southern Kuril Islands
Territorial dispute
Economic cooperation; Joint economic activity
Russia
Japan 
　
*Corresponding Author:
Voda Kristina,
Center for Asia-Pacific Studies, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations Russian 
Academy of Sciences, Profsoyuznaya str., 23, Moscow, 117997, Russian Federation;
Email: vodakris@gmail.com  
1. Introduction
In 2013-2019 Russo-Japanese relations have entered the period of dynamic development after a long peri-od of stagnation. In 2012, for example, Russian schol-
ars pointed to the lack of a clear strategic vision of future 
cooperation and slow progress in negotiations on the dif-
ficult issues of bilateral relations. The Japanese side was 
said to be unwilling to develop full-scale relations with 
Russia without progress in resolving the territorial dispute 
on its terms [1]. 
Shinzo Abe, who became the Prime Minister of Japan 
in 2012 for the second time, proposed to improve Rus-
sian-Japanese relations, advance peace treaty negotiations, 
and resolve a Kuril Islands dispute [2]. The Russian side 
responded positively as Russia regards the conclusion 
of a peace treaty with Japan as a necessary condition for 
bringing bilateral relations to a qualitatively new strategic 
level. 
In 2013-2019 the contacts between high-ranking 
Russian and Japanese officials intensified, the spectrum 
of bilateral talks broadened (including the dialogue in 
politics, economy, security, international issues, cul-
ture), and the economic cooperation was revitalized. 
The quantity of contacts between the leaders of Russia 
and Japan has grown significantly – Vladimir Putin and 
Shinzo Abe held their 27th meeting in Vladivostok on 
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September, 2019. In this paper, we aim to examine the 
progress in Russian-Japanese peace treaty negotiations 
in 2013-2019, as well as plans for economic cooperation 
on the southern Kuril Islands. The analysis of recent de-
velopments around the Kuril Islands will contribute to 
the discussion of this topic, which has received increased 
attention in literature [3].
2. Progress in Russian-Japanese Negotiations 
in 2013-2019
The current rapprochement between Russia and Japan be-
gan when Shinzo Abe took the office of the Prime Minis-
ter of Japan in December 2012. Abe expressed a desire to 
end the territorial dispute with Russia. By doing this, Abe 
– a descendant of prominent post-World War II politicians 
– aspired to leave his mark in Japan’s history as an influ-
ential leader, who managed to return the lost territories [4]. 
Abe made a bid to establish a trusting personal relation 
with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Thus, Abe fol-
lowed in line with the widespread Japanese idea that the 
territorial dispute with Russia can be resolved at the high-
est political level only. In April 2013, Abe visited Moscow 
for the first time. During the meeting between Abe and 
Putin, the parties recognized the absence of a peace treaty 
between the countries as “abnormal” and agreed to resume 
and expedite consultations on its signing [5]. In June of the 
same year, Russia-Japan vice-ministerial-level consulta-
tions on a peace treaty began.
The “Ukrainian crisis”, which began in 2014, suspend-
ed the Russian-Japanese rapprochement. Japan expressed 
solidarity with the restrictive measures against Russia 
taken by Western countries. In March-December 2014, 
Japan imposed sanctions on individuals and companies 
from Russia. Japan supported the suspension of Russia’s 
membership in the G8. In addition, consultations between 
officials in a number of significant areas were halted. 
Negotiations on visa facilitation, bilateral investment 
agreement, and military and space cooperation actually 
stopped. Despite the fact that Japanese sanctions were 
much softer than those of the US and the EU, the act itself 
has been deemed by Russia as an unfriendly gesture that 
hinders the bilateral relations [6]. 
Meetings of Russian and Japanese officials resumed 
in 2016, despite the lack of contacts between Moscow 
and other G7 member countries. On May 6, 2016, Prime 
Minister Abe visited Russian resort Sochi, where he held 
talks with President Putin. During the talks Abe stated that 
a “new approach” that is free from traditional stereotypes 
was needed to solve difficult problems in Russo-Japanese 
relations, including a territorial dispute. Japanese Prime 
Minister expressed confidence that it is possible to find a 
way out of the impasse in the peace treaty negotiations, as 
the leaders agreed to work together to resolve this issue by 
creating future-oriented relations. At the meeting in Sochi, 
the Russia and Japan agreed to continue peace treaty con-
sultations, which resumed in June 2016 in Tokyo.
In addition, Abe proposed to Putin an “8-point eco-
nomic cooperation plan”, providing for intensification of 
cooperation in the energy sector, small and medium-sized 
businesses, industrialization of the Far East, expansion 
of the export base, advanced technologies, including nu-
clear energy, and in the field of humanitarian exchanges. 
In accordance with this plan, Japanese ministries were 
instructed to prepare specific projects for the development 
of economic cooperation with Russia. A special group was 
created at the Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, which 
included all the deputy ministers of the economic sector. 
Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Seko 
Hiroshige was appointed responsible for the development 
of economic relations with Moscow. 
Abe has somewhat deviated from the traditional 
Japanese approach that linked the development of the 
economic cooperation with Russia with progress in 
resolving the territorial problem on Japanese terms. 
Instead Abe considered building up Russian-Japanese 
economic cooperation as a necessary step for creating 
favorable conditions and friendly atmosphere that will 
help to resolve difficult problems in bilateral relations. In 
Russia, where Japan is seen as a welcome and promising 
economic partner, as well as a source of advanced tech-
nology and investment, Abe’s economic proposals were 
received positively. At the same time, Russian leader de-
nied the possibility of any concessions in the territorial 
dispute in exchange for expanding the Japanese invest-
ment in the Russian economy [7].
The first state visit of Russian President Vladimir Pu-
tin to Japan in 11 years (held in the cities of Nagato and 
Tokyo) took place on December 15-16, 2016. The busi-
ness part of the summit ended with the signing of more 
than 80 agreements and memorandums of future cooper-
ation, the total value of which was estimated at 2.54 bil-
lion dollars. Plans were announced for the creation of a 
Russo-Japanese investment fund of $ 1 billion, the joint 
founders of which were the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation (JBIC) and the Russian Direct Investment 
Fund. Also, Putin and Abe gave start to consultations 
on conducting joint economic activities on the southern 
Kuril Islands, which was presented as a step towards 
the conclusion of a peace treaty on the basis of compro-
mise. The parties reaffirmed their determination to sign a 
peace treaty, continuing to discuss unresolved issues that 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/mmpp.v2i2.1250
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impede the achievement of this goal. 
The advancement of Russian-Japanese economic co-
operation under the “8-point plan” was discussed during 
Abe’s visit to Moscow on April 27, 2017. More than 20 
documents were signed on the implementation of joint 
projects in various fields, including the development of a 
gas field in Russian city of Irkutsk, the construction of a 
medicine center in the city of Khabarovsk, the introduc-
tion of the “smart city” system in Voronezh, etc. Leaders 
called the year of 2018 the Cross year of Russia and Ja-
pan, with more than 300 events planned and carried out 
under its framework, aimed at acquaintance with the cul-
ture of a neighboring country and developing humanitari-
an exchanges. Measures are proposed for organizing char-
ter flights to the southern Kuril Islands for their former 
residents that would replace sea trips that are irregular due 
to bad weather conditions and thus inconvenient. 
In 2017-2018 Russian-Japanese official contacts have 
become regular. At the same time, the lack of progress 
in peace treaty negotiations was becoming increasingly 
apparent. The intention to accelerate negotiations on the 
basis of the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956, 
was announced at the Russia-Japan summit meeting in 
Singapore on November 14, 2018. Since paragraph 9 of 
the Declaration states that the Soviet side will transfer to 
Japan the islands of Shikotan and Habomai after the con-
clusion of the peace treaty, the results of the Singapore 
meeting was taken by some as an agreement reached by 
Abe and Putin to transfer the southern Kuril Islands to 
Japan. 
After the Singapore summit meeting Abe announced 
that in 2019 there would be a “turning point” in the Rus-
sian-Japanese negotiations, and said that the transfer of 
the southern Kuril Islands requires the full consent of 
their current residents. Then the Japanese media reported 
that Japan could offer a waiver of compensation related 
to the southern Kuril Islands, which the Japanese side is 
currently claiming. These statements caused a widespread 
public uproar in Russia that it took the intervention of the 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which pointed out to 
the Japanese side through its ambassador that such public 
statements were unacceptable. In addition, in early Janu-
ary 2019, a bill “On Japan’s Territorial Claims to the Rus-
sian Federation” which prohibits the transfer of the Kuril 
Islands, was introduced to the State Duma of the Russian 
Federation. More over, in a number of Russian cities, 
including Moscow and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, public meet-
ings were held against the transfer of the Kuril Islands  to 
Japan. According to surveys, more than 70% of Russian 
residents and almost 100% of the inhabitants of the south-
ern Kuril Islands advocate that the islands remain under 
Russian sovereignty [8]. 
It appers that the domestic political situation in Japan, 
where a number of significant events took place in 2019, 
including the elections to the upper house of parliament, 
forced Prime Minister Abe to acceletare negotiations with 
Russia. In addition, Abe’s term as Japan’s Prime Minister 
expires in 2021, which may explain his intention to make 
2019 a “turning point” in the peace treaty negotiations. In 
turn, the absence of detailed information on the progress 
and content of the talks between Putin and Abe, some of 
which are held behind closed doors, has led to widespread 
fears and rumors in the public space of both countries. 
However, a surge of public concern did not lead to 
the suspension of official contacts between Russia and 
Japan. On June 28, 2019, President Putin paid a visit to 
Japan and participated in the G-20 Summit in Osaka. On 
September 4, Prime Minister Abe visited the Eastern Eco-
nomic Forum in Vladivostok. The parties confirmed their 
interest in developing dialogue, concluding a peace treaty 
and resolving contentious issues in their relations. The 
Russian side pointed to the need to continue rapproche-
ment in the trade, economic, political and humanitarian 
spheres. The Russian side believes that to further advance 
relations with Japan it is important to establish a visa-free 
regime with Japan, conclude an agreement on trade in 
services and investments, conclude an agreement on the 
exploration and use of outer space, etc.[9]. 
Under the “8-point economic cooperation plan” by the 
autumn of 2019 approximately 100 joint projects have en-
tered the implementation stage. The largest project is the 
participation of the Japanese consortium Mitsui&Co and 
Jogmec in Arctic LNG-2, a project for the construction 
of a natural gas liquefaction plant in the Yamal-Nenets 
Autonomous Region, with investments worth more than 
$ 5 billion. In addition, a test project of cargo transporta-
tion from Japan to Europe by the Trans-Siberian Railway 
is underway. Negotiations are ongoing on more than 100 
projects in the fields of tourism, agriculture, infrastructure 
construction, etc. The Japanese side has repeatedly stated 
the great potential for developing relations between Rus-
sia and Japan and expressed its intention to maximize this 
potential in the future [10].
3. Russia and Japan Positions on the Territo-
rial Dispute 
Despite the rapprochement of Russia and Japan in a wide 
range of areas in 2013-2019, the territorial dispute remains 
an obstacle, significantly complicating bilateral ties. There 
remain disagreements on the sovereignty over the southern 
Kuril Islands, on acceptable conditions for resolving a terri-
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/mmpp.v2i2.1250
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torial dispute, as well as on the significance of the territorial 
dispute for the development of bilateral relations.
Firstly, on the issue of island ownership, the Japanese 
position is that the “Northern territories” - Habomai, Shi-
kotan, Iturup and Kunashir Islands - are “ancestral terri-
tory” of Japan that are not included in the Kuril Islands, 
which Japan lost in accordance with The 1951 San Fran-
cisco Peace Treaty. In addition, Japan considers illegal the 
occupation of these territories by the Soviet Union, which 
occurred as a result of the USSR entering the war against 
Japan on August 8, 1945, and demands their return. Ac-
cording to the Russian position, Japan should recognize 
the post-war historical realities - that is, the Russian sov-
ereignty over all the Kuril Islands. 
Secondly, at present, the Russian side considers the 
Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956 to be the basis 
for solving the issue of territorial demarcation with Japan. 
This is the only document, which was ratified by both 
parties and has the status of an international treaty [11]. At 
the same time, the Russian President Vladimir Putin has 
repeatedly criticized the content of the document, noting 
that, although this declaration states that the Soviet Union 
is ready to consider the transfer of two islands to Japan, 
nothing is said about the conditions and whose sover-
eignty over these islands would be established [12]. In turn, 
Japan considers the provision contained in paragraph 9 of 
the Joint Declaration as an obligation of Russia to transfer 
the islands of Shikotan and Habomai. Thus, according to 
Japan’s position, the essence of negotiations on the ter-
ritorial issue is to determine the way of transferring the 
other two islands. There is no evidence so far for a change 
of posture by either party. Moreover, in 2019, Russia and 
Japan on different levels have confirmed their basic posi-
tions, which makes the task of reaching a compromise on 
the territorial issue difficult.
Regarding the significance of the territorial problem for 
the development of Russian-Japanese relations, Japan be-
lieves the issue of the sovereignty over the southern Kuril 
Islands to be the most significant topic of bilateral relations. 
Japan regards the resolution of the status of the four islands 
as a prerequisite for signing a peace treaty. Russia claims 
that the resolution of a territorial dispute should be a con-
sequence of the normalization of Russo-Japanese relations. 
As Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov noted, “closer 
interaction of our economies and civil societies, the estab-
lishment of good relations between our business people, 
mutual investments and implementation of joint economic, 
trade, infrastructure and foreign policy initiatives will help 
create an atmosphere that will be more favorable for sign-
ing agreements on even the most difficult issues” [13]. 
Thus, the significant disagreements between Russia and 
Japan, the unwillingness of the parties to abandon their 
basic positions, make the resolution of Kuril Islands issue 
highly unlikely in the short term.  
4. Plans for Joint Economic Activity on the 
Southern Kuril Islands
Joint economic projects on the southern Kuril Islands 
have been discussed by current leaders of Russia and 
Japan since 2016. However, for the first time, the idea to 
establish joint mutually beneficial economic activity on 
the islands was expressed in the text of the Joint Sovi-
et-Japanese statement of April 18, 1991, signed during the 
visit to Japan of USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev [14]. 
Then discussion of this issue continued during the presi-
dency of Boris Yeltsin. Then, parties had high hopes of a 
breakthrough after informal meetings between the leaders 
of Russia and Japan in the Russian city of Krasnoyarsk 
(1997) and the Japanese city of Kawana (1998). Howev-
er, plans for the joint development of these territories did 
not become the reality because Russia and Japan could 
not agree on the legal framework of cooperation on the 
islands. The issue of joint economic activity again came 
to the official level in 2009, when Russia proposed it to 
Japan during the visit of Russian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Alexey Borodavkin to Tokyo. The initiative was not fur-
ther developed because Japan entered a period of political 
turbulence due to the frequent change of governments. In 
addition, the visit of the Russian President Dmitry Med-
vedev to Kunashir on November 1, 2010 met opposition 
from Japan and led to deterioration of bilateral ties. 
The agreement to begin joint economic activity (JEA) 
on the southern Kuril Islands was announced at the sum-
mit of the leaders of Russia and Japan in December 2016 
in Tokyo. Five priority areas for the development of coop-
eration were identified: aquaculture, greenhouses, tourism, 
wind energy, and waste recycling. Russian proposal on 
JEA, which included the provision that all joint projects 
should be implemented in accordance with Russian legis-
lation, was initially rejected by the Japanese side [15]. The 
reason was the impossibility for Japan to recognize Rus-
sia’s sovereignty over the southern Kuril Islands. The final 
joint statement signed by the leaders of Russia and Japan 
in Tokyo indicated the need to reach an agreement on 
the legal framework for the implementation of the JEA, 
including conclusion of a separate international treaty. In 
addition, it was clarified that the JEA should not “damage 
the positions of the Russian Federation and Japan on the 
issue of a peace treaty” [16].
In 2017-2018 Japan sent three missions to the southern 
Kuril Islands to study the possibility of implementing the 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/mmpp.v2i2.1250
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JEA. The first mission, which included 69 Japanese offi-
cials and business representatives, visited Kunashir, Iturup 
and Shikotan Islands from June 27 to July 1, 2017. As the 
Japanese media noted, despite the fact that the mission 
was sent in a hurry, the Japanese government managed to 
attract big business. Most of the companies were from the 
Japanese island of Hokkaido, adjacent to the Kuril Islands 
[17]. The governor of the Russian Sakhalin Region Oleg 
Kozhemyako who accompanied the first mission indicated 
that local authorities were ready to create a favorable en-
vironment for the Japanese businesses, using mechanisms 
of public-private partnerships, subsidies, and provide 
access to the necessary infrastructure [18]. The second mis-
sion visited the southern Kuril Islands on October 26-31, 
2017, and the third was sent on August 16-22, 2018. As a 
result, by the fall of 2019, two test projects in tourism and 
waste disposal were prepared for implementation. The 
Japanese expressed interest in developing cooperation in 
other areas such as growing strawberries in greenhouses, 
cultivating sea cucumbers and scallops, building wind 
farms, and creating tourist complexes [19].
Agreeing on a legal framework for conducting the JEA 
on the southern Kuril Islands is one of the main objectives 
that will determine the success of joint projects. Japan’s 
refusal to conduct business on the islands in accordance 
with Russian legislation, and the related legal uncertainty, 
discourages businesses to implement commercial projects 
on these territories. 
One of the important aspects of the JEA is the visiting 
regime for Japanese citizens to the southern Kuril Islands. 
The Japanese government doesn’t support the standard 
way to travel to the islands on a Russian visa through 
the city of Sakhalin, thereby once again confirming the 
non-recognition of Russian sovereignty over these territo-
ries. In 1991-1998 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Rus-
sia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan agreed on 
the visa-free exchanges between Russian citizens perma-
nently residing on the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shiko-
tan and the citizens of Japan [20].
In recent years, within the framework of “visa-free 
exchanges”, 15-20 Japanese groups visit islands every 
year with a total number of about 300-500 people. Since 
1992, approximately 20 thousand Japanese citizens visited 
the southern Kuril Islands [21]. According to the Japanese 
government, Japanese groups should include certain cate-
gories of citizens: former residents of the islands and their 
descendants, politicians, officials, journalists, doctors, 
scientists etc. Japanese trips are aimed at visiting former 
Japanese settlements on the islands, and familiarizing the 
inhabitants of the islands with Japanese culture, traditions, 
teaching the Japanese language. The composition of the 
groups is approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan on the basis of applications submitted through au-
thorized organizations, such as the Hokkaido Committee 
to Promote Exchanges with Four Northern Islands, the 
Northern Territories Issue Countermeasures Associa-
tion, the League of Residents of Chishima and Habomai 
islands, etc. The travel plan for the year is agreed upon 
during Russian-Japanese consultations on the regional and 
diplomatic levels. In addition, the program of each trip 
requires approval by the diplomatic authorities of the two 
countries. Thus, the lack of a free movement for the Jap-
anese citizens on the southern Kuril Islands complicates 
the implementation of the JEA on these territories. Rus-
sia has repeatedly called to expand the visa-free regime 
throughout the Sakhalin Region. However, Japan has not 
yet accepted this proposal, advocating the preservation of 
the regime of “visa-free exchanges” only for four islands.
Thus, the implementation of the JEA on the southern 
Kuril Islands is complicated by the problems of harmoniz-
ing the legal framework for doing business. In 2019, the 
Russian side expressed dissatisfaction with the volume 
of business projects and the speed of their coordination, 
as stated by Foreign Minister S. Lavrov, calling the size 
of the JEA “modest and unimpressive.” [22]. The Japanese 
government, in turn, continues to seek special conditions 
for doing business on the islands.
5. Conclusion 
In 2013-2019 Russia and Japan expanded political, diplo-
matic, trade, economic and humanitarian interaction. At 
the same time, the parties could not overcome the deep 
differences on the issues of territorial demarcation and the 
conclusion of a peace treaty. The intention of Russia and 
Japan to advance in solving the territorial problem on the 
basis of a mutually acceptable compromise was expressed 
in the plans for joint economic activity in the southern Kuril 
Islands. Despite the difficulties in coordinating the econom-
ic and legal aspects of operating businesses on the islands, 
Russian and Japanese officials continue negotiations on 
the issue, which led to the project launch in 2019. This re-
confirms the interest of both sides in joint activities aimed 
at building confidence and increasing interdependence in 
these territories. The immediate task for Russia and Japan 
is to continue to build upon the result of rapprochement 
initiated by the leaders of the countries and continue negoti-
ations on the peace treaty that will upgrade their relations.
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